Thursday, 27 January

Dull, not too cold

At 3.00 in the afternoon I visited American Ambassador Harriman. According to him with regard to the mediation of the Soviet-Polish Incident the Soviet Government thanked the American Government for its help, but admitted that the timing was not right for its good will to be used. What the Soviet Government meant was the reorganisation of the Polish Government because the Soviet Union was sure that among the important figures in the Polish Government some of them were anti-Soviet. Also these anti-Soviet elements were still accusing the Soviet Union of a policy of using Poland as a shield so the Soviet Union definitely has no intention in negotiating with them. To the Soviet Union probably the most repugnant thing is the policy of a safe buffer zone against the Soviet Union. Under current circumstances, it depends on whether Poland can be awakened and reorganise its government. As for his discussion with Molotov, the Soviet Government did not express any ill-feelings towards American intervention on this matter. Instead it expressed the hope that the Soviet-Polish Incident would not affect cooperation between Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union. So although the path to solving this matter is rugged, it is not yet hopeless. If this matter is handled carelessly, then neither side will give in. The Soviet army has already occupied Poland. If another Government is organised, it will not only provoke civil war in Poland, but also have a very bad effect on world prospects. I asked him, according to his discussion with the Soviet Union, if it expressed its preference for organising another government or not. He said no. He also said that if the Soviet Union can get a Polish Government which is not anti-Soviet, like the one in Czechoslovakia, it will be delighted, but if not, he was unable to predict. I also asked Harriman’s opinion with regard to Eden’s report in the British Parliament, saying that the British Government could not recognise the post 1939 border, and that the principle of the Atlantic Charter should be maintained. Harriman said, according to his impression, what Eden meant was that any change in the country’s boundary should be discussed at the peace conference. If the boundary is decided before the conference, it must be agreed by both sides and cannot be solved unilaterally. This is reasonable. As to British-Soviet relations, after the Soviet side publicised the rumour in Cairo, public opinion in the United States towards it is very negative. As a matter of fact, the Soviet Union is unable to gauge British and American mentalities. I also asked about the rumour concerning Finland asking the United States to mediate. Harriman said there was no such thing. He said several months ago, the Americans tried to persuade Finland to leave the Axis group, but Finland demanded resssurecting the boundary prior to the Soviet-Finn war in 1939. Finland presented itself as the state which scored the victory. So it was therefore impossible to mediate. Then we talked about the Turkish issue. He said before the Moscow Conference, Turkey was very suspicious towards the Soviet Union, but after the conference, Roosevelt as well as Churchill talked to the Turkish President and the atmosphere appeared to change for the better. But the Soviet Union thought that what Turkey did was not the duty of the Allied countries, so the prospect is far from promising.

Today Eden made a report in the British Parliament with regard to the Soviet-Polish Incident. Although Ambassador Harriman explained it like this, I thought that what Eden said was equal to giving an extremely strong reply to the Soviet Union. If it doesn’t give in, the prospect will be very gloomy. It is a great pity that such an unfortunate thing has happened between the Allies.

The Argentinian Government has declared that it will cut off diplomatic relations with the Axis countries. It is certainly influenced by the United States’ stern attitude.