Wednesday, 19 January

Snow

Last night’s Moscow broadcast and this morning’s Soviet newspapers all published stories that the British Foreign Office has denied making secret unilateral peace talks with Germany.

At 5.00 in the afternoon I went to see the American Ambassador Harriman. He said as follows: 1) With regard to Pravda reporting the news about a unilateral peace talk between Britain and Germany, he could not understand the aim behind this and he could not ask Molotov now, because it was definitely not related to military matters. As to the second war zone and other military plans, these were all resolved at the Tehran Conference. Britain and the United States have implemented the plan accordingly, and the Soviet Union has repeatedly expressed its eager satisfaction. 2) With regard to the Polish-Soviet Incident, he was instructed by the American Government that he express his willingness to help the Soviet Union, and what the Soviet Union showed was quite positive. Although he has now exchanged some opinions with Molotov, still he did not raise any concrete suggestions because the most difficult thing for this issue is not on boundaries, but on getting the two governments to trust each other. As a matter of fact within the Polish Government there are anti-Soviet and anti-reactionary elements, for example its Commander-in-Chief, Sosnkowski, and Propaganda Minister Kote and others, since these elements are leaders of the Polish Government and are still there it will be hard to win the Soviet Union’s trust. Therefore, the best thing for the Polish Government is to reorganise its government. On the Soviet side, since Soviet strength has increased so much, the Soviet Union should be generous, saying that although the Polish Government has been anti-Soviet before, it will now forgive it. But the Polish Government should reflect and correct its mistakes. Britain and the United States would then respect the Soviet Union for its generosity and the Polish anti-Soviet elements would not dare oppose this. But it is not easy for the Soviet Union to act like this, so the prospect for this action is not hopeful. He also said that his work is even more difficult because the American people know very little about the Soviet-Polish border relationship, and also the Curzon line. They only know the Atlantic Charter, and the principle that they should be sympathetic to weak peoples, so many of them are supportive towards Poland. Moreover, there are five million Polish voters and their strength is significant. The thing which most relieved him was that the three governments of Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed jointly that their cooperation will not be affected by this Polish issue. He then asked for my opinion about this issue. I said with regard to the border, it is no good making the Soviet Union give way, and if Harriman can make the Polish Government reorganise and expel its anti-Soviet elements, and at the same time persuade the Soviet Union to cooperate with it and not to organise another government, then his contribution to the Soviet Union and Poland will be exceptional. Because on the one hand it will make the Soviet Union not suspect someone would manipulate the anti-reactionary and anti-Soviet Poland, on the other hand it will make it clear to people in the world that it has no ambition to turn neighbouring countries ‘Red’. This is important concerning Allied cooperation and the future of the world. He agreed strongly, and said that Britain and the United States certainly would not support an anti-reactionary Polish Government, but it was only very natural that the Polish should be unwilling to accept the Soviet-styled Communist system, so for the Poles’ happiness it should be like this. 3) With regard to the killing of Polish military officers, he has talked with Sikorski face to face. He criticised asking the Red Cross to investigate saying it was no good. Sikorski admitted that it was a wrong decision, and said that at the time he was ill and bed-ridden and his subordinates took it to him and asked him to sign. Ambassador Harriman and I thought this war more brutal than any war in history, particularly for Germany and the Soviet Union. It is certainly difficult to expect that the Polish military officers and soldiers will receive better treatment from the Soviet Union than from their own subjects. He also said that the Commander-in-Chief, General Anders, and others believed that the Soviet Union could not stay on, so they sent their troops away and did not agree to cooperate with the Soviet Union in the fighting. He thought it was the biggest mistake and the Polish newspapers repeatedly attacked the Soviet Union, and this naturally aroused bad feelings. I abstracted the main idea and reported to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Liaison Attaché Colonel George A. Hill of the British military delegation invited me for lunch. Many British military officers were there, including some of whom had fought in Burma. According to them using the army to attack Burma from India was not easy.

In the past two days, the United States’ newspapers have commented on the Soviet claim about the secret unilateral peace talks between Britain and Germany. As I expected, they all thought that this move by the Soviet Union was wrong. The Soviets do not understand the character and mentality of the British and Americans. It is exactly the same that the British and Americans do not understand Soviet thought. This poses cooperation difficulties.